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COMMENTS
SELF-INSURANCE IN TEXAS- A PENNY WISE
BUT POUND FOOLISH DEVICE?
SCOPE
The Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act' is a legisla-
tive attempt to remove from the highways vehicles driven or owned
by persons who demonstrate lack of financial ability to satisfy judg-
ments rendered against them for damages caused by negligent opera-
tion of such motor vehicles.' The act provides several alternate ways
for proving financial responsibility,' but there is no doubt that the
most widely used method is motor vehicle liability insurance.4 "Self-
insurance" is one method by which the owner of more than twenty-
five motor vehicles may satisfy the requirements of the act and yet
avoid paying large annual insurance premiums. Self-insurance is
specifically authorized by section 34 of the act, which states that
"The Department may, in its discretion . . . issue a certificate of
self-insurance when it is satisfied with [sic] such person is possessed
and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay judgments ob-
tained against such person."
The purpose and scope of this Article is to determine the extent
and nature of the risks assumed by persons who become self-insur-
ers under the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
NATURE OF SELF-INSURANCE
Not a Mere Exception to the Act
The basic difficulty and ambiguity presented by section 34 is
whether the legislative intent was for a self-insurer to assume broad-
er responsibility and liability than he would ordinarily be subject
to under the familiar agency doctrine of respondeat superior.' If
the legislature did not intend to impose a greater liability than that
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann., art. 6701(h) (Supp. 1958).
2 See §§ 5, 7 of art. 6701 (h). The act will be referred to hereafter by section only.3 Sections 12-18.
4 Marryott, "Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsibility," 287 Annals 83, 85
(1953); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on Problems Created
by Financially Irresponsible Motorists 1 (1952); 1 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law & Practise ii-ix (1948); Vance, Insurance 24 (3d ed. 1951); 2 Spectator Insurance
Year Book, Casualty & Surety xxi-xxiii (1949).
'Schroeder v. Rainboldt, 128 Tex. 269, 97 S.W.2d 697 (1936); Ochoa v. Winerich
Motor Sales Co., 127 Tex. 542, 94 S.W.2d 416 (1936); Restatement, Agency § 219,
228 (1933).
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at common-law, it becomes apparent that section 34 is no more
than a device by which the Texas Department of Public Safety
may in its discretion exempt financially responsible owners of more
than twenty-five motor vehicles from the sanctions and mandates
of the act. Such a construction would reduce section 34 to a mere
exception to the act, as then recovery against the "self-insurer"
would be allowed only if the self-insurer would be liable in any
event as a principal under traditional agency doctrine. It is be-
lieved that such a narrow construction would not properly reflect
the legislative intent or purpose; indeed, if a "self-insurer" was in-
tended to assume no more liability than an ordinary principal, a
simply worded exception to the act would probably have been em-
ployed to effect that end instead of several elaborate sections de-
fining the sphere of self-insurance.! It is difficult to arrive at a con-
clusion other than that the entire import, purpose, and design of the
legislature in creating self-insurance, was to impose greater obliga-
tions upon self-insurers than they would ordinarily be subject to
by the law of agency. However, this question can be determined
only by judicial decision, and until a pronouncement is made on
this point, a prudent self-insurer would first, assume that the act
will be so interpreted, and second, explore the legal consequences
resulting from his unique status as a self-insurer.
An Important Distinction
At this point one may well inquire whether there is a legal dis-
tinction to be drawn between a person's (or business entity's) ca-
pacity as a common-law "principal" and his capacity of self-insurer
under the Texas act, and if there is, of what importance it may be.
It is reasonable to assume that in most motor vehicle accident cases
where such was caused by the negligence of a self-insured's agent,
the principal (self-insurer) would be liable for the damages because
the negligent act was done within the scope of the agent's express
or implied authority. Such a fact situation presents no difficulties
for it is only of academic interest whether the principal is liable
under respondeat superior, or because he is an insurer of the motor
vehicle operator; he is certainly liable, regardless of the theory em-
ployed.
However an unusual situation may arise under section 34 when
the negligent operator of a motor vehicle owned by a self-insurer
was not an agent, servant, or employee of the self-insurer and/or
was not acting within the scope of his express or implied authority
'See § 5(c), 18(4), 34.
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when the accident occurred. This is the precise question to which
the remainder of this Article is devoted; namely, what is the liabil-
ity of a self-insurer when one of his motor vehicles is negligently
operated so as to cause injury, but the self-insurer (owner of the
vehicle) would not be held liable as a principal under respondeat
superior or any other agency doctrine? Before this question can be
answered, however, it is necessary to explore the theoretical basis
and nature of self-insurance.
Self-Insurance is not Authentic
Insurance but a Risk-Shifting Device
It is well agreed that every genuine scheme of insurance requires
at least the following features:'
(a) Possession by the insured of an interest susceptible of pe-
cuniary estimation, i.e., an insurable interest.
(b) The insured is subject to risk of loss of that interest if cer-
tain perils occur.
(c) The insurer assumes that risk of loss for the insured.
(d) Such assumption is part of a general scheme to distribute
actual losses among a large group of persons, each bearing similar
risks.
(e) Insured makes his ratable contribution to the common in-
surance fund, popularly known as the "premium."
It is time-tested insurance theory that a plan having just the first
three features is not true "insurance" but merely a device to shift
the losses caused by certain perils and risks from the "insured" to
another person.' In applying these general criteria to the self-insur-
ance sections of the Texas act, it becomes quite obvious that im-
portant deficiencies in the act prevent the classification of self-
insurance as true insurance.
No Premiums Are Paid
The most prominent departure from technical insurance require-
ments is the fact that no premiums are paid by the insured, nor
are reserves for possible claims required under the act.' The act
itself specifically states that the certificate of self-insurance" must
be " . . . supplemented by an agreement by the self-insurer that
'Vance, op. cit. supra note 4, citing National Service Corp. v. State, 55 S.W.2d 209
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism.; 1 Duer, Marine Insurance 54 (1845).
Vance, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1, pp. 4-5.
'See p. 3 of Form SR-1, published by the Texas Department of Public Safety, where




... he will pay the same judgments and in the same amounts that
an insurer would have been obligated to pay." Apparently it was
intended that the general assets of the self-insurer would be avail-
able instead of a formal insurance fund.1
No Spreading of the Risk Occurs
Another standard insurance feature that is lacking in the self-
insurance plan is the requirement of a general scheme to distribute
actual losses among large diverse groups of insureds, each subject
to similar risks and perils. This deficiency is the fiat accompli that
reduces the Texas plan of self-insurance to nothing more than a
risk-shifting device.12 The general scheme of widespread loss dis-
tributions is the very heart of all insurance theory."3 The insurance
industry has learned through decades of experience that most at-
tempts at insurance underwriting are doomed to failure unless a
large enough selection of widespread risks is achieved. 4 The Texas
act falls far short of this requirement. Even a self-insurer with
well over twenty-five motor vehicles is not "spreading the risks"
sufficiently to hope that he could pay several large or even average
sized judgments per year and still have a net saving over the amount
of insurance premiums that would otherwise have been paid. In
short, it may be said that the self-insurer is really gambling that
his vehicles will not be involved in accidents, and if he is lucky,
insurance premiums will be saved. If he is unlucky, however, his
assets may well be consumed in a short period of time.
Other Factors
The remaining three features of a true plan of insurance are
satisfactorily fulfilled under the Texas act. The self-insurer clearly
possesses an insurable interest in the preservation of his assets, and
risk of loss due to liability imposed by an accident involving one
of his motor vehicles is always present. Shifting of the risk is not
as clearly obvious (for the same person operates in both capacities,
i.e., insurer and insured), but it is present in the sense that a self-
insurer agrees to pay certain judgments as if he were an insurance
carrier."
"Section 18 (4). Note however that this agreement is required only as proof of financial
responsibility for the future, i.e., after an accident has occurred. Apparently no such
agreement is necessary as a condition precedent to qualification under S 34.
12 "While a policy under seal for no premium paid would at common law be enforce-
able as an indemnity bond, it could scarcely be considered a proper insurance contract."
Vance, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 5.
"3 Vance, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5, citing Malynes, Lex Mercatoria 105 (3d ed. 1686).
14 Ibid.
1s Section 18 (4).
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From the above analysis, one may conclude that Texas self-
insurance certainly is not "insurance" in the traditional sense, but
rather is a quasi-insurance"6 scheme whereby the public is sup-
posedly protected against judgment-proof owners and operators
of motor vehicles, and a qualified owner is allowed to avoid both
the penalties of the act and expensive premiums by assuming his
own risks. Theoretically the scheme appears simple and easy of
interpretation, but, as often occurs when rights and obligations
are created by statutory enactment, peculiar fact situations arise
which were not contemplated by the legislators who drafted the
act.1" Thus the ultimate question for decision in this Comment is
whether the broad language of the act goes further than was
probably intended, and does impose liability on the self-insurer
when he would not be liable as a principal, i.e., is his assumption
of risk the same as that imposed on an ordinary liability insurance
carrier under the standard Texas automobile liability policy.
LIABILITY ASSUMED By A SELF-INSURER
Theoretical Basis of Self-Insurer's Liability
It is believed that the true basis for self-insurers' liability is
found in the doctrine of third party beneficiary contract. Con-
tracts for the benefit of parties other than the promisee have been
long recognized in the law.'8 Traditionally such third parties are
divided into two"9 primary classes: donee beneficiaries and creditor
beneficiaries. A donee beneficiary situation is found where "the pur-
poses of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of
the performance thereof, is to . . . confer upon him (the donee
beneficiary) a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee
to the beneficiary."" When this principle is applied to the facts of
the present discussion it is obvious that all requistes are satisfied. The
"promisor" is any owner of over twenty-five motor vehicles who ap-
" See the following workmen's compensation self-insurance cases for a possible analogy.
These cases indicate without so holding, that self-insurers are to be treated as insurance
carriers for many purposes. Friend Bros., Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 316 Mass. 639,
56 N.E.2d 6 (1944); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 314, 199 Pac. 152(1921).
"See, e.g., Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Civil No. 18,533, 134th
Jud. Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, Texas, appeal now pending.
18 Restatement, Contracts, illustration 4, § 133(1) (a) (1932).
"°Williston, Contracts § 356 (rev. ed. 1936), presents a possible third catagory which
is of minor importance in most cases.
"National Surety Co. v. Diggs, 272 S.W.2d 604, 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error
ref. n.r.e.; Restatement, Contracts § 356 (1932).
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plies for a certificate of self-insurance under section 34 ;2 the "prom-
isee" is the state of Texas acting through its duly established admin-
istrative agency;12 the third party beneficiary is any person who suf-
fers bodily harm or property loss "arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of a motor vehicle" owned by the promisor." In
effect the promisor (applicant) contracts with the state of Texas
that he will pay for such losses. Sufficient consideration for the
promise, if such be necessary, is found in the self-insurer's exemp-
tion from penalties imposed in case of violation of the act."4
This theory is further sustained by the fact that the Texas act
does not require liability insurance or other proof of financial
responsibility until after an accident occurs, 5 nor does it anywhere
purport to make such insurance mandatory; all relations between
the state and motor vehicle owners and operators are on a purely
voluntary basis. It is submitted that the rights and liabilities of an
authorized self-insurer are firmly rooted in the law of contract, and
the duties which devolve on the self-insurer will in large part be
determined therefrom.
What Liability Does The Self-Insurer Agree To Assume
As a self-insurer's liability is founded on a contractual basis, it
is relatively easy to ascertain the extent of that liability by inter-
pretation of the "contract" made between the "self-insurer" and
the state.
Section 34 of the act is the basic authorization for self-insurance,
as witness its broad language: "The Department may ...upon ...
application ...issue a certificate of self-insurance when it is sat-
isfied ...such person is possessed and will continue to be possessed
of ability to pay judgments obtained against such person." This
can readily be construed to impose upon the motor vehicle owner
the burden of "insuring" anyone driving the vehicle with his ex-
press or implied permission, even though not acting at the time of
the accident in a capacity which would create a principal-agent
relation. This construction would seem to carry out the manifest
intent and spirit of the act. Otherwise a self-insurer could loan his
motor vehicles to employees and friends for weekends, vacations,
2' He agrees once an accident occurs to "pay the same judgments and in the same
amounts that an insurer would have been obligated to pay .... .. S 18 (4). See note II
supra.
2 Namely, the Texas Department of Public Safety. S 1(12).23See S 1(10).
24 See §5 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14.
2 Section 5(a) and (b); see also National Surety Co. v. Diggs, 272 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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or overnight2 (where no agency question could be raised) and not
only avoid liability as either a principal or self-insurer, but also
save premiums for insurance coverage which would insure any law-
ful operator of the vehicle regardless of an agency relation.2 Such a
result would defeat the very public policy the act was designed to
promote. Further inequities are possible, as consider the following:
Many drivers of self-insured vehicles carry no personal liability
insurance, for example, on their own cars if such be owned, which
would cover the driver even when operating a different vehicle.2
A gross injustice could occur in case of accident, for the injured
party likely would be left without a solvent defendant to proceed
against. Such a result is diametrically opposed to the avowed pur-
pose of the act (as well as all similar financial responsibility laws)-
preventing judgment-proof owners or operators from driving or
owning motor vehicles.2'
Section 18 (4) of the act is an additional indication that the leg-
islature intended self-insurers to be responsible even in situations
where the agency element is absent. This section provides that proof
of financial responsibility may be given after an accident has oc-
curred by filing a "certificate of self-insurance, as provided in Sec-
tion 34, supplemented by an agreement by the self-insurer that,
with respect to accidents occurring while the certificate is in force,
he will pay the same judgments and in the same amounts that an
insurer would have been obligated to pay under an owner's motor
vehicle liability policy if it had issued such a policy to said self-
insurer." (Emphasis added.) It is a basic principle in automobile
liability insurance that the insurance carrier covers anyone operating
the vehicle with permission of the named insured. Therefore it
should be obvious that the legislature's very words in section 18 (4),
quoted above, expressly require a self-insurer to assume risks not
unlike those assumed by an ordinary insurance carrier." A different
" It is believed that such is common practise for firms owning many automobiles and
other small motor vehicles.
2?The Texas standard automobile policy defines "persons insured" as "(1) the named
insured." Curry, General Insurance for Texas 77 (1955).
""Persons insured" under the standard Texas policy include with respect to a non-
owned automobile, "(1) the named insured." Curry, op. cit. supra note 27.
2
"Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim 13 (1954).
" See note 27 supra.
31See S 21(f) (1)-(2) which states that "the liability of the insurance company with
respect to the insurance required by this Act shall become absolute whenever injury or
damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs .... " It should be noted
that art. III (§§ 4-11) of the act relates to the type of security required following
the first accident, to avoid the sanctions and penalties. Compare art. IV (5§ 12-29) which
relates to proof of financial responsibility for the future. The latter article does not apply
until after the first accident; however, its provisions (that the self-insurer "agree" to
[Vol. 12
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interpretation would be difficult to sustain either in reason, logic,
or public policy.
Based on the foregoing principles, the extent of liability assumed
by a self-insurer may be summarized as follows: Self-insurers under
the Texas act are absolutely liable" for damages which occur as a
result of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle
owned by said self-insurer, irrespective of the self-insurer's liability
as a principal or employer, and regardless of other insurance pro-
tecting either the operator or self-insurer.
Limitation on Liability
Section 21 of the act defines a motor vehcile liability policy in
detail and imposes absolute liability"3 on the insurance carrier after
an accident occurs, and provides that such liability may not be
defeated by acts or agreements of either insured or insurer subse-
quent thereto. However section 21(g) explicitly provides that the
maximum amount for which an insurer may be absolutely liable
is to be within "basic limits."3 "With respect to a policy which
grants . . . additional coverage the term 'motor vehicle liability
policy' shall apply only to that part of the coverage which is re-
quired by this Section."'" The importance of determining maximum
limits of liability, if any, assumed by a self-insurer should be evi-
dent. For example, if an employee of a self-insurer causes injury
while operating a motor vehicle within the scope of his employment,
the self-insured employer is personally liable for the entire amount
of damages on agency principles discussed above. Since it is clearly
established above that a self-insurer takes risks which occur outside
the scope of his business-as when the driver is acting on a purely
personal mission-the question presented is whether the self-insurer
exposes himself to unlimited liability as insurer of anyone operating
his motor vehicle.
The act is obscure on this very important issue. Several sections
mention the minimum amounts required to establish "proof of
financial responsibility " " but the context of these sections indicates
assume all obligations of an ordinary insurance carrier) will always apply and govern in
every case because the alternative methods of giving proof of financial responsibility (§
18) are just as onerous as filing the "agreement," and if used, would defeat the very
advantages sought to be gained by becoming a self-insurer.
" Limitation on liability is discussed below.
" This is subject, of course, to plaintiff's ultimate recovery of a final judgment. See
§ 6(4) of the act.
"4Basic limits are $5,000 per person; $10,000 per accident; $5,000 property damage.
Board of Insurance Commissioners, Rules and Rates Governing the Insuring of Automo-
biles, rule 2 (1955).
31 Section 21 (g).
3Sections 1(10), 5(c), 15, 18, 19, 21, 25.
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that the legislative intent in establishing limits was, primarily, to
provide a bare minimum of responsibility for drivers and owners,
and secondarily to provide a method by which the sanctions and
penalties of the act can be avoided if and when such minimum
responsibility is proved." The act apparently is not concerned
with maximum insurance coverage, and hence any amount over
and above basic limits would be a matter of private contract be-
tween the insurance carrier and the insured. It must be strongly
emphasized here that section 34 does not limit the amount a self-
insurer agrees to pay. This section" provides for the certificate to be
issued when the Department of Public Safety is satisfied that "such
person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to
pay judgments" obtained against such person." (Emphasis added.)
From the plain meaning of this section, there is no limit whatso-
ever to the contractual liability assumed by a self-insurer. Con-
ceivably a generous self-insured employer could allow an employee
to use a business motor vehicle over a vacation period, and if that
employee is at fault in an accident involving that motor vehicle,
the employer could be held liable as an insurer of the driver for
many thousands of dollars, even though there is no principal-agent
question involved. The same holds true for all acts of an agent
which take him out of the course of his employment."
Section 18 (4) might be the basis of an argument to the contrary,
for it provides that the self-insurer ". . . will pay the same judgments
and in the same amounts that an insurer would have been obligated
to pay under an owner's motor vehicle liability policy if it had
issued such a policy to said self-insurer." A "motor vehicle liability
policy" is so defined in section 21 (b) as to restrict the minimum
coverage required by the act to basic limits. 1 This argument would
be convincing but for section 21(g) which expressly provides
that coverage in excess of basic limits is neither affected by nor
subject to the definition of "motor vehicle liability policy" in sec-
tion 21(b). In other words, only the basic limit amount is con-
trolled by the act, and all excess is a matter of private contract.
It is the writer's conclusion that by virtue of the donee beneficiary
contract theory as well as the plain meaning of section 34, a self-
3 7 See §§ 5(c), 6, 18.
"STaken with § 18(4).39,, 'Judgment'--Any judgment which shall have become final . . . upon a cause of
action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, for
damages ....... 1 (12).
'See, e.g., Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency §§ 520-26 (3d ed. 1923).
41 See note 34 supra.
[Vol. 12
COMMENTS
insurer "agrees" to pay and be liable for judgments in any amount;
in effect it is open-face insurance.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Other Collectible Insurance
The Texas standard automobile liability policy provides that when
the insured is operating another vehicle, that insurance is secondary
to any insurance on the vehicle, and will apply only if there is
an excess of uncollected damages over and above any such valid
and collectible primary insurance on the vehicle being driven,
which is always the "primary" insurance." Thus a very interesting
situation is presented when the operator of a self-insured vehicle
has liability insurance on his personal automobile. As the "coverage"
provided by the self-insurer is the primary insurance, and since it
has been concluded above that there is no upper limit of liability,
the personal insurance of the driver could not be relied upon as
"excess insurance" for the simple reason that with open-face pri-
mary insurance, there could never be an excess of unsatisfied dam-
ages where secondary insurance coverage would be necessary. A
possible exception would exist where the self-insured's assets become
exhausted and still the final judgment is not satisfied. Then the
secondary insurance of the driver would respond up to its policy
limits. This situation should rarely occur as most self-insurers have
sufficient assets to satisfy even the largest judgments arising out of
one accident.
Subrogation
No matter how grossly at fault the operator of the self-insured
motor vehicle may be, and even though the accident occurred be-
yond the scope of the operator's employment, the self-insurer has
no cause of action against the negligent operator based on subroga-
tion principles. This is due to the basic rule of subrogation that
usually an insurer has no subrogation rights against his insured, '
and it has been established above that the driver is an "insured" of
the self-insured owner.
Parties
An important question arises regarding parties to the suit, for
it is well established in Texas trial procedure that the fact of in-
42 Pasley v. American Surety Co., 253 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error dism.;
Smith v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 178 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Curry, op. cit.
supra note 27, 88-89.
" See § 21 (h) for a possible exception.
19 58 ]
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surance may not be communicated to the jury by the plaintiff where
the sole defendant is the operator of the vehicle." This rule is pre-
served in section 11 of the act which states that neither the reports
filed, action taken, nor findings made by the Department of Public
Safety ". . . nor the security filed as provided by this Article shall
be referred to in any way, nor be any evidence of the negligence
or due care of either party, at the trial of any action at law to
recover damages." (Emphasis added.) The wording of section 34
(b) would seem to permit the plaintiff to join the self-insurer as
a co-defendant with the motor vehicle driver, or even as the sole
defendant.
These apparently conflicting sections in the same statute present
a problem which must be solved by the courts or legislative amend-
ment. It would seem a reasonable solution to allow the self-insurer's
joinder only in the situation where he clearly would be liable in any
event as a principal, and not to allow his joinder when his liability is
founded solely on his "agreement" to insure the driver. This solu-
tion is less than perfect for often the agency issue will be a hotly
contested point in the case and a matter for the jury to decide.
Amendment of the act would be the best way to give certainty of
meaning to these ambiguous, conflicting sections.
CONCLUSION
Self-insurance as allowed in the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act is not true insurance. The self-insurer assumes
much greater risk than is readily apparent and this liability, being
founded in the doctrine of third party beneficiary contract, is po-
tent and irrevocable. A different interpretation of the act is un-
likely in view of the important social, economic, and public policy
motives which led to the enactment of such law. This is further for-
tified by the fact that a goodly number of large businesses operating
many motor vehicles, allow their employees to make personal use
of such vehicles for vacations, weekends, and overnight.
No reported case has been found which determined the liability
of self-insurers, a fact which circumstantially indicates that self-
insurers have been lucky so far. One Texas district court case" now
on appeal is known to the writer which involves the matters dis-
cussed herein. It is the writer's considered opinion that most self-
44Mancada v. Snyder, 137 Tex. 112, 152 S.W.2d 1077 (1941); McCormick & Ray,
Texas Law of Evidence S 1539 (2d ed. 1956).
4' See note 17 supra.
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insurers are not aware of the full extent of their possible liability
and if the premises and conclusions of this Article are correct, all
self-insurers could *ell re-examine the prudence of such practice.
Self-insurance may indeed turn out to be a "penny wise but pound
foolish" device.
Morton L. Susman
